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Myths, Realities, and the
Political World*: The
Anthropology of Insanity
Defense ~ttitudes
Michael L. Perlin, JD
The author presents the case that society's efforts to understand the insanity
defense and insanity-pleading defendants are doomed to intellectual, moral, and
political gridlock unless we are willing to take a fresh look at the doctrine through
a series of filters-empirical research, scientific discovery, moral philosophy,
cognitive and moral psychology, and sociology-in an effort to confront the single
most important (but rarely asked) question: why do we feel the way we do about
"these people" (insanity pleaders)? He examines this question finally through a
model of structural anthropology and concludes that until we come to grips with
the extent to which ours is a "culture of punishment," we can make no headway
in solving the insanity defense dilemma.

I wrote The Jurisprudence of the Insanity
Defense for a combination of reasons.
Primarily, I was concerned that we had
* Bob Dylan, "Political World" (OH MERCY,Special
Rider Co., 1989):
We live in a political world
Love don't have any place
We're living in times where men commit crimes
And crime don't have a face
...
We live in a political world
Where mercy walks the plank

...
Dr. Perlin is a Professor of Law, New York Law School,
New York, NY. This paper was the Guttmacher Award
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Psychiatric Association, May 21, 1995. Much of this
article is adapted from M. L. Perlin, The Jurisprudence
of the Insanity Defense, Durham, NC, Carolina Academic Press, 1994. All newspaper articles cited subsequent to Reference 63 are available in the NEXISI
NEWSICURNWS database. Address correspondence to:
Michael L. Perlin, JD, New York Law School, 57 Worth
St., New York, NY 10013.

been frittering away our intellectual capital for decades in our approach to what
we see as "the insanity defense problem."
We expended countless person-hours
worrying about cognitive tests, affective
tests, and nonexistent lemon squeezers.
We spent thousands of court hours on
briefs, test cases, appeals. and hearings
contesting such questions as the quantum
of proof in the insanity acquittal retention
hearing. We looked to deeply flawed and
basically meretricious alternatives such as
the guilty but mentally ill verdict as a
palliative to our consciences and as a
means of conning ourselves that we were,
in fact, "doing something" about the insanity defense "problem."
Yet, I felt that all of this mattered per-
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ilously little. Why did I say this? Because
we continued to do precisely what we
have done for decades, centuries, and perhaps millennia. We spout platitudes, we
reify myths, we create straw men, we talk
angrily about insanity defense "abuse,"
we look longingly to insanity defense
"abolition" or "reduction" as panaceas
(not simply to the question at hand, but
fantastically, as a means of solving all
contemporary crime problems); we speak
scornfully of slick lawyers and deceitful
experts; we automatically assume that a
defendant who raises the insanity defense
must be faking (although, at least one
court opinion and one voter survey
I
reveals-somewhat
remarkably,
thought-that it doesn't matter if the plea
is "real" or "faked; our antipathy is almost identical); finally, we deride psychodynamic and behavioral explanations
of "crazy" behavior when it appears "obvious" to one and all that the defendant,
in fact, "did it."
To do all this, we must be willing to
jump through quite a set of hoops. We
must be willing-in
spite of unanimous
evidence to the contrary-to adhere to a
set of empirical and behavioral myths
about the plea's frequency and success
rate, its dispositional outcomes, etc. We
must be willing to close our eyes to a
series of validated testing instruments; to
ignore scientific evidence on brain biochemistry; to discredit philosophical reasoning-and we regularly do just that.
I thus decided to write this book, The
Jurisprudence of the Insanity Defense, in
an effort to answer the questions that I
just raised. And when I actually started to
write a book, I realized that all of these
6

questions were somehow subordinate to
(and served to subtly obscure) the one
overarching question that was never specifically asked or articulated, but which, it
seemed to me, totally dominated the
"deep structures" of our insanity defense
discourse: why do we feel the way we do
about "those people"?
The answer to that question, it seemed
to me, would allow us to collapse all of
the other questions into one that might
actually be-at least in part-answerable
and that might even give us some guidance as to what, if anything, we could do
to resolve (or at least to clarify) the "insanity defense problem." At the base of
all of the questions, all the myths, all the
misstatements, all the misassumptions,
there remained-or so it seemed to meone basic truth: that we simply didn't
care.

The Roots of Our Apathy
We didn't care about the empirical realities, about the behavioral realities,
about scientific tests, about philosophical
advances, about constitutional interpretations. We didn't care for what now
seemed to me to be a set of very obvious
reasons: that there was something about
the use of the insanity defense, and about
the persona of the insanity defense
pleader (and by extension, his lawyer and
the expert witness testifying on his behalf), that revolted the general public to
the core; that the successful insanity
pleader truly was one of the most "despised" individuals in society; that the use
of the insanity defense seemed to reflect,
to so many Americans of every political
stripe, all that was wrong with this coun-
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try and with its legal system; and that the
continued existence of the insanity defense simply was dissonant with the political world that we had constructed.
It didn't matter whether we reified
myths and ignored realities, because it
was the myths that were consonant with
the schema that we had painted of our
criminal justice system. To a great extent,
like all other myths, these myths have
proven impervious to proofs of data and
rational argument alike.
I had been thinking about these issues
for a long time and had always been
struck by the way that the "scholarly"
debate and the "public" debate seemed to
be taking place in two entirely different
force fields. Scholars pondered the true
doctrinal differences between the
M'Naghten test, the Model Penal Code,
and the "irresistible impulse" test, creating a set of obscure and implausible hypothetical~having nothing to do with the
insanity defense in practice or in the lives
of mentally disordered offenders in general. All of this was done in a vain effort
to convince the public that changes in the
substantive wording of the test really mattered. The public, on the other hand, appeared to be profoundly disinterested in
the defense, unless and until one of two
things happened: either a politician announced that abolition of the defense
would solve the nation's crime problems,
or a high-profile case involving a sympathetic victim captured media attention.
The first of these events happened in
the early 1970s when President Nixonwithout any empirical support, by the
way-charged that the defense was subject to "unconscionable abuse."' There

was a flurry of activity at that time, but it
seemed to dissipate fairly rapidly (and
that dissipation was perhaps spurred on
by a finding that, in the calendar year
when the charge was made, there were
only four insanity acquittals recorded in
all federal jurisdictions).
The second, of course, did not dissipate. When John Hinckley shot and attempted to assassinate President Reagan,
the path of the insanity defense was forever altered in this country. Hinckley's
successful use of the defense immediately
shifted the entire playing field and altered
the terms of the debate. The entire debate
now became dramatically flipped: would
the insanity defense-a
defense whose
roots were found in the Talmud, the
Codes of Justinian, and the Dooms of
Alfred2-survive John Hinckley's expression of unrequited love for Jodie Foster? Insanity defense supporters found
themselves frantically engaged in rearguard actions. Abolition became the centerpiece of a major federal crime bill,
legislation that was quickly mimicked in
many states. And after lengthy congressional hearings, the fact that the defense
was reduced from the American Law Institute (ALI)/Model Penal Code test to the
M'Naghten rules of 1843 was seen as a
major "victory" for insanity defense supporter~.~.
States followed suit quickly, both limiting the substantive tests while tightening
procedural rules. All of this meant that
the use of the insanity defense-never a
particularly attractive option to criminal
defendants and never one that was used
extensively-was going to be even rarer
and certainly was going to be greeted
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even more critically by judges, jurors, the
media, and the general public.
In short, since the passage of the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984,5 the
insanity defense landscape has changed
dramatically and irrevocably. Any politician or elected judge willing to support it
as a matter of principle has to realize that
it will serve as a convenient symbol for an
"anti-crime" opponent to focus upon.
Any lawyer representing a severely mentally disabled criminal defendant must
recognize that, if she enters an insanity
defense plea, the jurors will likely be
suspicious, negative, and hostile. Any editorial writer or columnist suggesting that
the defense remains a viable alternative
needs to know that such a position will
likely inspire a rash of angry letters to the
editor denouncing the supporter as soft on
crime, or worse. And any law professor
(or forensic mental health professional)
willing to be identified as a supporter of
the defense must realize that she is fighting a very lonely battle.

The Roots of Dissonance
What is it about the insanity defense
that affects us this way? Why is the public's reaction so homogenous, and why is
it so dissonant from that of many of the
professionals who have spent their lives
studying these questions?t Why is the
insanity defense the screen upon which
the community projects its "visions of
criminal justice"? These are some of the
t I make some exceptions here, of course: Dr. Abraham
Halpem has been a principled opponent of the insanity
defense for decades. We disagree on the merits, but I
need to articulate my respect for Dr. Halpem and his
position and emphasize that my criticism of insanity
defense critics in no way goes to him or to his positions.
8

questions that must be addressed in this
inquiry.
First, let us see what can be determined
about attitudes from the defining congressional hearings that followed the Hinckley insanity acquittal. I start here because
my sense is that, if we scrutinize these
hearings, we can begin to understand how
we, the general public, really do construct
the insanity defense and why we continue
to focus on it irrationally and obsessively
as the root of all that is wrong with the
American criminal justice system.
According to Representative Coughlin,
insanity defense reform was a Maginot
line of sorts: "nothing less than the credibility of our Federal justice system is at
stake," he said in underscoring what he
saw as the significance of the hearings.6
This hyperbole was repeated continuously, in different contexts, by other
members of both Houses of Congress
during the debates. Thus, Attorney General Meese argued that insanity defense
abolition would "rid . . . the streets of
some of the most dangerous people that
are out there, that are committing a disproportionate amount of crime^."^ Senator Quayle asserted that the "decadent
demoralizing court decisions . . . pampered criminals" and gave defendants the
right to kill "innocent people with impunit^."^ Senator Symms added that a criminal justice system that included an insanity defense could "no longer represent
. . . a civilized society."9
Next, look at what our legislators said
about the use of the defense: "a safe harbor for criminals who bamboozle a
"a rich man's defense""; a doctrine-this from former attorney General

Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1996

Insanity Defense Attitudes

William French Smith-that allows "so
many persons [italics added] to commit
crimes of violence . . . and have the door
opened to them to return to . . . society,"12
in former U.S. Attorney Giuliani's words,
"roam[ing] the streets"13; a defense that
includes "everything from alcoholism and
drug addiction to heartburn and itching"
(this latter observation, by the way, was
characterized as a "thoughtful" one)14;
and finally, and most probatively, again
in Giuliani's words, a defense that allows
defendants to "get away with murder" in
"many, many c a ~ e s . " ' ~
Each of these statements, of course, is a
textbook parody of the empirical and behavioral data. The insanity defense is
rarely used and is disproportionately used
in cases involving indigent defendants;
jurors are rarely deceived; not guilty by
reason of insanity (NGRI) acquittees often spend double the amount of time institutionalized as defendants charged with
the same crimes; two-thirds of insanity
pleas are raised in cases not involving a
victim's death. 16- l 7
Of course, the fact that these statements
were myths may not have mattered much:
the House (of Representatives) Report accompanying the Insanity Defense Reform
Act astonishingly conceded that the basic
beliefs about the insanity defense were
myths, but justified the new legislation
nonetheless because these myths "undermined public faith in the criminal justice
system."18 This little-noticed concession-that Congress must assuage sentiment that it knows to be false-reflects
the lasting power of the insanity defense
myths.

Myths and Symbols
The myths speak to the symbol. The
insanity defense, simply put, is and always has been "the acid test of our attitudes toward the insane and toward the
criminal law itself."19 Judge Bazelon
called it a "scapegoat for the entire criminal justice system."20 It symbolizes "the
loss of social control in the eyes of the
public."2'
The defense, in short, is simply dissonant with our perceptions of how a criminal justice system "should" operate. Its
purported abuse symbolizes the alleged
breakdown of law and order, the failure
of the crime control model, the ascendancy of a "liberal," exculpatory, excuseridden jurisprudence, and these symbols
are at play in the most charged context
imaginable-the trial of a mentally disabled criminal defendant.

Historical Perspectives
These findings suggest that it is necessary to distance oneself by viewing the
subject in its historical context. It was
clear that there were parallels between the
Hinckley trial and the trial of Daniel
M'Naghten (and that public reactions
were astonishingly similar to both verdicts), but the findings force us to further
consider the origins of our attitudes about
mental illness, about crime, and about
"evil." Perhaps this inquiry might shed
some light on why we do the things we do
when it comes to mentally disabled criminal defendants.
Mental Illness and Sin This research
illuminated some important historical
constants: for 5,000 years, conceptions of
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mental illness have been linked inextricably to concepts of sin. Mental illness was
seen, more than 2,000 years ago, as "a
punishment sent by God."22 Through the
Middle Ages, "demonic possession remain[ed] the simplest, the most dramatic
and, secretly, the most attractive of all
explanations of insanity."23 Mental disease was God's punishment for sin, and
mentally disabled persons were seen as
agents of the devil.$
It is no wonder that Michael Foucault
suggested that this "face of madness" has
"haunted" Western man's imagination for
at least 5,000 years.25 Thus it is no surprise that religious attitudes always exerted great influence on the medical
"treatment" of the mentally ill, and to a
great extent our characterizations of
"sickness" track precisely what medieval
theologians called "sin."26
This conflation of mental illness and
sin needs to be considered in the context
of the role of punishment in our criminal
justice system. When President Reagan
campaigned for Republican senators
whom he could count on to appoint
"tough" federal judges, he said pointedly:
"We don't need a bunch of sociology
majors on the bench"; and when Attorney
General Thornburgh spoke at the National Crime Summit, he said: "We are
not here . . . to discuss sociological
theory,"27.28 what were they saying? On
one level, at least, they were rejecting
what society often sees as psychodynamic
psychiatry's perceived "peculiar tolerant
$ "In post-medieval times the retarded, together with . . .
the insane, from whom they were not generally distinguished, were viewed as the progeny of the supernatural,
and in the last several centuries as agents of the

10

attitudes toward criminal beha~ior,"~'
and its desire to undermine the powerful
force of punishment in the criminal justice system.30
It is to this "culture of punishment" that
I want to turn briefly, because I do not
think we can begin to grasp underlying
issues without giving this phenomenon
some serious consideration.
Culture of Punishment Punishment
was originally a "ritualistic device" conveying "moral condemnation," "inflicting
humiliation," and dramatizing evil
through a public "degradation ceremony."315Punishment of criminals was seen
as a means of both avoiding mob violence
and furthering social solidarity by protecting "against the terrifying anxiety that
the forces of good might not triumph
against the forces of evil after all."32
None of this, however, addresses the
question of why we need to punish. This
is not an easy question, but I believe the
best explanation is simply that our innate
sense of justice is profoundly disturbed if
we see another go unpunished for his
antisocial behavior. In J. C. lug el's^^
words:
By punishing the criminal, we are not only
showing that he can't 'get away with it,' but
holding him up as a terrifying example to our
tempted and rebellious selves. . . . Connected
with this is the danger with which our whole
notion of justice is threatened when we observe
that a criminal goes unpunished. . . .

§ R. ~ o l d t quoting
~'
Gordon Hawkins, Punishment and
deterrence: the educative, moralizing, and habituative
effects, Wis L Rev, 550-60, 1969; see also Hawkins,
supra at 555: "Punishment is a ritualistic device designed to influence by intimating symbolically social
disapproval and society's moral condemnation."
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In short, criminal punishment is society's
antiaggression safety valve; we project
our guilt, blame, shame, and fear, express
our collective anger and hostility, and
show the criminal that he cannot succumb
to temptations (as we (the law abiding) do
not succumb), and thus preserve the illusion of an even-handed justice system.34
Of course, the insanity defense flies in
the face of all of this. For many reasons,
the insanity defense serves as the perfect
scapegoat for all that is perceived as inexplicable about our criminal justice system. It symbolizes "the most profound
issues in social and criminal justice." It
underscores the gap between the public's
perceptions of how the criminal justice
system should operate and the way that,
in a handful of cases, a "factually guilty"
person can be diverted from criminal punishment because of moral or legal nonresponsibility.
Sin, Evil, and Madness Beyond this,
the insanity defense flies in the face of the
way that we have traditionally conflated
sin, evil, and madness. Although modern
psychiatry and psychology illuminate
many of the reasons why certain criminal
defendants commit apparently incomprehensible, "crazy" acts, we reject such psychodynamic explanations, both on personal and justice-system levels. We do
this because such an explanation-indeed, the existence of the insanity defense
itself-robs us of our need (our desire,
our compulsion) to mete out punishment
to the transgressor. Most strikingly, we do
this even when we are faced with incontrovertible evidence that the "successful"
use of an insanity defense can lead to
significantly longer terms of punishment

in significantly more punitive facilities
than the individual would have been subjected to had he pled guilty or been found
guilty after a trial.36

Insanity Defense Myths
What is there about the insanity defense that inspires such massive societal
irrationality? Why do we adhere to these
myths, ignore the reams of rational data
that patiently rebut them, and willfully
blind ourselves to the behavioral and empirical realities that are well known to all
serious researchers in this area? It is to
these questions that I now turn.
Our insanity defense jurisprudence is
premised on a series of empirical and
behavioral myths, myths that empirical
research has revealed to be "unequivocally disproven by the facts."37 There are
at least eight separate empirical myths to
be addressed briefly.
Myth #I: The Insanity Defense Is
Overused All empirical analyses have
been consistent: the public at large and
the legal profession (especially legislators) "dramatically" and "grossly" overestimate both the frequency and the success rate of the insanity plea, an error
"undoubtedly . . . abetted" by media distortions. The most recent research reveals, for instance, that the insanity defense is used in only about one percent of
all felony cases and is successful just
about one-quarter of the time.38
Myth #2: Use of the Insanity Defense
Is Limited to Murder Cases In one jurisdiction where the data have been
closely studied, contrary to expectations,
slightly less than one-third of the successful insanity pleas entered over an eight-
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year period were reached in cases involving a victim's death.39 Furthermore,
individuals who plead insanity in murder
cases are no more successful in being
found NGRI than persons charged with
other crimes.40
Myth #3: There Is No Risk to the
Defendant Who Pleads Insanity Defendants who asserted an insanity defense
at trial, and who were ultimately found
guilty of their charges, served significantly longer sentences than defendants
tried on similar charges who did not assert the insanity defense. The same ratio
is found when only homicide cases are
~onsidered.~'
Myth #4: NGRI Acquittees Are
Quickly Released from Custody A
comprehensive study of California practice showed that only one percent of insanity acquittees were released following
their NGRI verdict and that another four
percent were placed on conditional release, the remaining 95 percent being
h~spitalized.~~
Myth #5: NGRI Acquittees Spend
Much Less Time in Custody Than Do
Defendants Convicted of the Same Offenses. Contrary to this perception,
NGRI acquittees spend almost double the
amount of time that defendants convicted
of similar charges spend in prison settings
and often face a lifetime of postrelease
judicial oversight. In California, those
found NGRI of nonviolent crimes were
confined for periods over nine times as

Myth #6: Criminal Defendants Who
Plead Insanity Are Usually Faking
This is perhaps the oldest of the insanity
defense myths, one that has bedeviled
12

American jurisprudence since the mid19th century. Of the 141 individuals
found NGRI in one jurisdiction over an
eight-year period, there was no dispute
that 115 were schizophrenic (including 38
of the 46 cases involving a victim's
death), and in only three cases was the
diagnostician unwilling or unable to specify the nature of the patient's mental illn e s ~ .46a
~~,
Myth #7: Most Insanity Defense Trials Feature "Battles of the Experts"
The public's false perception of the circus-like "battle of the experts" is one of
the most telling reasons for the rejection
of psychodynamic principles by the legal
system. A dramatic case such as the
Hinckley trial, of course, reinforced these
perceptions. The empirical reality is quite
different. On the average, there is examiner agreement in 88 percent of all insanity cases.47*48
Noting the existence of these myths,
however, is simply informational. It does
not explain why the myths develop or
why they persist in the face of unanimous, hard data to the contrary; or why
only 3 or 4 of approximately 400 newspaper articles that I have read in the past
year about the use of the insanity defense
have even hinted at the empirical truths
refuting these myths.
One of the first explanations must be
the law's ongoing and generalized rejection of psychodynamic principles as a
means of explaining human behavior. I
see three aspects of this rejection as especially important: the roots of the legal
system's profound ambivalence about
psychiatry and toward psychiatrists; the
importance of punishment in our system
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of criminal justice, and the specific, obsessive fears that are regularly uncabined
in response to any suggestion that psychodynamic principles can aid the law in
disposing of cases involving mentally disabled criminal defendants.

The Law's Ambivalence Toward
Psychiatry
This ambivalence is not news. The law
has always been-paradoxically-fascinated and repelled by, and overwhelmingly ambivalent about, psychiatry's role
in the adjudicative process. On one hand,
courts frantically desire to have mental
health professionals testify as to longterm future dangerousness (an expertise
that psychiatrists for the most part freely
acknowledge they do not have) and "take
the weight" on difficult cornrnitJrelease
decisions (especially in cases involving
retention hearings of insanity acquittees),
while at the same time characterizing psychiatry as "the ultimate wizardry" or psychiatrists as "medicine men" or "shamanistic wizards."
This ambivalence permeates mental
disability law. Psychiatric expertise is
valued when it serves a social control
function of the law (such as testifying in
involuntary civil commitment proceedings in support of commitment applications), but is devalued when it appears to
subvert that purpose (such as testifying in
insanity defense cases in support of a
defendant's nonresponsibility claim).49."

Anthropology and the Insanity
Defense
What does any of this have to do with
anthropology? Anthropologists study cul-

ture; they study the form and structure of
culture; the study the content of ~ u l t u r e . ~ '
Anthropologists study attitudes-social
attitudes, cultural attitudes and political
attit~des.'~
And they study myths.53
The study of attitudes and myths is
particularly relevant here. It is impossible
to understand the politics of the insanity
defense jurisprudence without understanding the social and cultural attitudes
that drive legislative and judicial decisionmaking as well as public policy. And
it is also impossible to understand this
phenomenon without understanding the
social and cultural myths that drive the
behavioral and empirical myths. I use the
word "myth" self-consciously, as social
anthropologists do: "a sacred tale about
past events which is used to justify social
action in the present."54
I have tried to demonstrate the roots of
the insanity defense myths as well as their
universality. What is as important as their
existence, in addition, is the firmness of
our beliefs in them as objective realities.
Every civilization, according to Claude
LCvi-Strauss, "tends to overestimate the
objective orientation of its thought, and
this tendency is never ab~ent."'~So it is
with the insanity defense.
Just as "madness" has specific cultural
meanings56 and just as cultural factors
affect the course of major mental illn e ~ s , 'we
~ can now say that attitudes toward the insanity defense have such
meanings and affect the course of treatment (and the ultimate disposition) of the
case of an insanity-pleading offender.
Just as explanatory models of sickness are
"sets of generalizations which enable the
thinker to produce information about par-
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ticular sickness episodes and events,"58
so can we say that explanatory models of
the insanity defense plea and pleaders do
the same thing.
Let me try to "tease this out" a bit more
specifically by narrowing my inquiry to
what I understand is the school of structural anthropology. Structuralists agree
that all culture consists of sets of concepts
that are in psychological tension with
each other (e.g., we cannot make sense of
"black" without realizing that it contrasts
with "white"; we can't understand "citizenship" without understanding that it
contrasts with "alienage.")59 Now concharacter'
sider how Richard ~ e r e l m a n ~
izes this:
Such narratives appear in myths, rituals, popular culture, ceremonies or even institutionalized
behaviour in which exemplary persons (heroes,
villains, etc.) . . . depict components of the sets
themselves. In effect, such persons 'act out,'
'display,' or 'exercise' the culture.

Building on these insights in a recent
manuscript, Douglas ~ o s s m a n looks
~ ' at
the way we construct mentally ill persons,
specifically mentally ill homeless persons:
This . . . helps us appreciate how mentally ill
persons . . . are ambiguous, perplexing, and
troubling figures in the context of American
political culture. They represent a set of contradictions to us because they fail to tlt well into
the set of structural oppositions that our culture
gives us to organize our experience. American
mythologized individualism ascribes to persons
a high level of autonomy, personal responsibility, and rationality; these are the ingredients
needed for persons to vindicate their natural
goodness amidst corrupting social influences.
But left alone, the homeless mentally ill "seem"
in some ways to be very natural and clearly
rejecting society's norms, yet they make troubling choices.
14

Think, in this context, about the insanity defense, about its roots and our attitudes. Think about how we structure good
and evil, well and sick, lawful and unlawful, sane and insane. And think about the
way that, on one hand, the existence of an
insanity defense satisfies our needs for
expressing such tensions (as the D.C. circuit court said in United States v.
Brawner, "'free will' is the postulate of
responsibility under our jurisprud e n ~ e " ) but
, ~ ~on the other hand creates a
tension (where it appears to let a factually
guilty person "get away with it") that may
simply be "too much" for our legal system's "tensile strength."
This approach piqued my curiosity, so
I decided to continue a bit further. For the
past year, I have conducted a daily computer search for the words "insanity defense" in the NEWS library of the NEXIS
database on the LEXIS system to show
the extent to which the myths that I have
been talking about persist and the way
they seem to fit into this structural anthropological model.
The New Research The database reveals few surprises. According to the
news media, the allegedly "popular" ini n g than a
sanity d e f e n ~ e ~ ~ ~ n o t hmore
a "re"legalistic slight of hand"64-is
ward" to mentally disabled defendants for
"staying
a "travesty,"66 a "loophole,"67 a "refuge,"68 a " t e ~ h n i c a l i t ~ , " ~ ~
one of the "absurdities of state law,"70
perhaps a "monstrous f r a ~ d . " ~It' is
used-again, allegedly-in cases involving "mild disorders or a sudden disappointment or mounting frustrations . . . or
a less-than-perfect ~ h i l d h o o d . "It~ ~
is responsible for "burying the traditional
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zenry-through letters to the editors-is
Judeo-Christian notion of moral responsibility under a tower of p~ychobabble."~' virtually identical.loO In the words of a
13-year-old writing about the O.J. trial to
When it is pleaded, successful defendants are perceived either as spending a
the Fresno Bee:
"short time" in mental hospitals (before
Of course, if he did do it, there's always the
being released to unsupervised freegood old temporary insanity defense, a sure-fire
d ~ m ) or, ~as~being simply "set free."75
way to bail out of just about any heinous crime,
especially
murder.lO'
Defendants' criminal responsibility is
still being assessed by visual frames of
The Roots of the Myths
reference: if he didn't "seem frenzied"76
Why do these myths persist? Why did
or appear insane, then "there's no crazithey originally emerge? Why have they
ness here;"77 and of course, the Dan
shown such remarkable longevity? Why
White "Twinkie defense" continues to be
do
cases such as Hinckley's have such a
seen as some kind of norm in insanity
ca~es.~~-~O
profound effect on the perpetuation of the
The "default drive" of prosecutors is
myths? Why do they appear essential to
simply to argue that the defendant was
the continued order of society? Why do
faking or
Criminal dethey continue to capture a significant portion of the general public and the legal
fense lawyers may refer to their own incommunity? How do they reflect a "comsanity-pleading clients as "a monster, a
munity consciousness"? Finally, why
Franken~tein."~~
Potential jurors are
may their persistence doom any attempt
sometimes excused because they appear
to establish a rational insanity defense
too eager to sit on insanity defense cases
(and certainly not because of their desire jurisprudence, no matter how much conto enter an NGRI verdict).86 Even a
flicting empirical data are revealed?
spokesperson for the American PsychiatTo answer these questions, it is necesric Association misinforms the press as to
sary to look at the roots of these myths.
An examination of the literature and the
the appropriate test for assessing the need
for continuing confinement of insanity
case law reveals at least four reasons for
acquit tee^.^^
the myths' persistence: ( I ) the (irrational)
fear that defendants will "beat the rap"
Additionally, of course, politicians fothrough fakery, a millennium-old fear
cus on abolition of the insanity defense as
that
has its roots in a general disbelief in
a panacea for urban crime problems, callmental illness, and a deep-seated distrust
ing it "one of the absurdities of state
law,"" providing a hiding place for crimof "manipulative" criminal defense lawyers invested with the ability to "con"
inals "to avoid responsibility."g9 Legislajurors into accepting spurious expert testive candidates point to insanity defense
support as an indicium of an opponent
timony; lo2 (2) the sense (among members
being soft on crime.90These positions are
of the legal community and the general
public) that there is "something different"
regularly endorsed in newspaper editoria l ~ . Finally,
~ ~ - ~the~ voice of the citiabout mental illness and organic illness,
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so that, while certain physiologic disabilities may be seen as legitimately exculpatory, "mere" emotional handicaps are not;
(3) the demand that a defendant conform
to popular images of extreme "craziness"
in order to be "legitimately insane," a
demand with which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and other members of the current Supreme Court appear entirely comfortable; and (4) a fear that the "soft,"
exculpatory sciences of psychiatry and
psychology, claiming expertise in almost
all areas of behavior, will somehow overwhelm the criminal justice system by
thwarting the system's crime control
component. '03
Why is this? Why do we feel this way?

Explanations of the Myths
This is a question that seems to me to
be rarely asked and even more rarely answered. I decided to approach it, though,
because I thought that unless we look
long and hard at this question-basically,
what is there about the way we think,
reason, and react that makes us susceptible to these myths-all of our study and
time would be little more than academic.
I thus have focused on several overlapping constructs drawn from cognitive
psychology. law, sociology, philosophy,
and my own invention in an effort to
answer the question. I will first explain
briefly what I mean by each of these
concepts and then turn to their relationship to the way we feel about the insanity
defense.
First, the use of heuristics (a cognitive
psychology construct that refers to the
implicit thinking devices that individuals
use to simplify complex, information16

processing tasks) leads to distorted and
systematically erroneous decisions and
causes decisionmakers to "ignore or misuse items of rationally useful information." One single vivid, memorable case
overwhelms mountains of abstract, colorless data upon which rational choices
should be made.'04
Thus, through the "availability" heuristic, we judge the probability or frequency
of an event based on the ease with which
we recall it.'05 Through the "typification"
heuristic, we characterize a current experience via reference to past stereotypic
behavior; through the "attribution" heuristic, we interpret a wide variety of additional information to reinforce preexisting stereotypes.Io6
Next is the concept of ordinary common sense (OCS). The positions frequently taken by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Thomas in criminal procedure
cases best highlight the power of OCS as
an unconscious animator of legal decisionmaking. Such positions frequently
demonstrate a total lack of awareness of
the underlying psychological issues and
focus on such superficial issues as
whether a putatively mentally disabled
criminal defendant bears a "normal appearance." '07
These are not the first jurists to exhibit
this sort of close-mindedness. Trial
judges will typically say "he [the defendant] doesn't look sick to me," or, even
more revealingly, "he is as healthy as you
or me."10s In short, where defendants do
not conform to "popular images of 'craziness,"' the notion of a handicapping
mental disability condition is flatly and
unthinkingly rejected.'" Views such as
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these reflect a false kind of "ordinary
common sense."110 In criminal procedure, OCS presupposes two "self-evident" truths: "First, everyone knows how
to assess an individual's behavior. Second, everyone knows when to blame
someone for doing wrong."l '
The next concept is what 1 call sanism,
meaning an irrational prejudice of the
same quality and character of other irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of
racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic
bigotry. It infects both our jurisprudence
and our lawyering practices. Sanism is
largely invisible, largely socially acceptable, and is based predominantly upon
stereotype, myth, superstition, and deindividualization. ' l 2
Judges, legislators, attorneys, and laypersons all may exhibit sanist traits and
profess sanist attitudes. It is no surprise
that jurors reflect and project the conventional morality of the community, and
judicial decisions in all areas of civil and
criminal mental disability law continue to
reflect and perpetuate sanist stereotypes."'
The concept of sanism must be considered hand-in-glove with that of pretextuality. Sanist attitudes often lead to pretextual decisions. By this I mean simply that
fact-finders accept (either implicitly or
explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest (frequently
meretricious) decisionmaking, specifically where witnesses, especially "expert" witnesses, show a "high propensity
to purposely distort their testimony in order to achieve desired ends." The pretexts
of the forensic mental health system are

reflected in both the testimony of forensic
experts and in the decisions of legislators
and fact-finders. Experts frequently testify in accordance with their own selfreferential concepts of morality and
openly subvert statutory and case law criteria that impose rigorous behavioral
standards as predicates for commitment
or that articulate functional standards as
prerequisites for an incompetency-tostand-trial finding. l 4
Finally, we need to consider teleology.
The legal system selectively (i.e., teleologically) either accepts or rejects social
science evidence depending on whether
or not the use of that data meets the a
priori needs of the legal system. In cases
where fact-finders are hostile to social
science teachings, such data thus often
meet with tremendous judicial resistance,
and by the courts expressing their skepticism about, suspicions of, and hostilities
toward such evidence. 15-' l7
Courts are often threatened by the use
of such data. Social science's "complexities [may] shake the judge's confidence
in imposed so~utions.""~The courts'
general dislike of social science is reflected in the self-articulated claims that
judges are unable to understand the data
and to apply it properly to a particular
case.I l 9 Thus, social science literature
and studies that enable courts to meet
predetermined sanist ends are often privileged, while data that would require
judges to question such ends are frequently rejected. Judges often select certain proferred data that adheres to their
preexisting social and political attitudes
and use heuristic reasoning in rationalizing such decisions. Social science data
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are used pretextually in such cases and
ignored in other cases to rationalize otherwise baseless judicial decisions.
How do these concepts "play out" in
insanity defense cases? At the outset,
consider that the insanity defense is a
textbook example of the power of heuristic reasoning. Insanity defense defenders
attempt to use statistics (to rebut empirical myths), scientific studies (to demonstrate that "responsibility" is a valid, externally verifiable term, and that certain
insanity-pleading defendants are simply
"different"), and principles of moral philosophy (to prove that responsibility and
causation questions are legitimate ones
for moral and legal inquiry). On the other
hand, the vivid anecdote or the self-affirming attribution overwhelm all attempts at rational discourse. Insanity defense decisionmaking is a uniquely fertile
field in which the distortive "vividness"
effect can operate and in which the legal
system's poor mechanisms of coping with
"systematic errors in intuitive judgment"
made by heuristic "information processors" become especially troubling. The
chasm between perception and reality on
the question of the frequency of use of the
insanity defense, its success rate, and the
"appropriateness" of its success rate all
reflect this effect.
Also, reliance on OCS is one of the
keys to understanding why and how our
insanity defense jurisprudence has developed. Not only is it "prereflexive" and
"self-evident," it is susceptible to precisely the type of idiosyncratic, reactive
decisionmaking that has traditionally typified insanity defense legislation and litigation. Paradoxically, the insanity de18

fense is necessary precisely because it
rebuts "common-sense everyday inferences about the meaning of conduct."'20
Empirical "investigations corroborate
the inappropriate application of OCS to
insanity defense decisionmaking. Judges
"unconsciously express public feelings
. . . reflect[ing] community attitudes and
biases because they are 'close' to the
c~mmunity."'~'
Virtually no members of
the public can articulate what the substantive insanity defense test is. The public is
seriously misinformed about both the
"extensiveness and consequences" of an
insanity defense plea,"122 and the public
explicitly and consistently rejects any
such defense substantively broader than
the "wild beast" test.Iz3
What about sanism? Insanity defense
decisionmaking is often irrational. It rejects empiricism, science, psychology,
and philosophy and substitutes myth, stereotype, bias, and distortion. In short, our
insanity defense jurisprudence is the jurisprudence of sanism.
Like the rest of the criminal trial process, the insanity defense process is riddled by sanist stereotypes and myths such
as: (1) reliance on a fixed vision of popular, concrete, visual images of "craziness"; (2) an obsessive fear of feigned
mental states; (3) a presumed absolute
linkage between mental illness and dangerousness; (4) sanctioning of the death
penalty in the case of mentally retarded
defendants, some defendants who are
"substantially mentally impaired," or defendants who have been found guilty but
mentally ill; ( 5 ) the incessant confusion
and conflation of substantive mental status tests; and (6) the regularity of sanist
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appeals by prosecutors in insanity defense
summations, arguing that insanity defenses are easily faked, that insanity acquittees are often immediately released,
and that expert witnesses are readily
duped.
Sanism, in short, regularly and relentlessly infects the courts in the same ways
that it infects the public discourse. It synthesizes all of the irrational thinking
about the insanity defense and helps create an environment in which groundless
myths can shape the jurisprudence. As
much as any other factor, it explains why
we feel the way we do about "these people." As I will discuss next, it also provides a basis for courts to engage in pretextual reasoning in deciding insanity
defense cases.
Pretextual decisionmaking riddles the
entire insanity defense decisionmaking
process; it pervades decisions by forensic
hospital administrators, police officers,
expert witnesses, and judges. Hospital decisionmaking is a good example. A Task
Force of the National Institutes of Mental
Health, convened in the wake of the
Hinckley acquittal, underscored this point
in its final report: "From the perspective
of the Hospital, in controversial cases
such as Hinckley, the U.S. Attorney's Office can be counted upon to oppose any
conditional release recommendation [emphasis added]."124 As John Parry has explained, "hospitals have been pressured
by public outrage to bend over backwards
to make sure that no insanity acquittee is
released too soon, even if such pressure is
contrary to the intent and spirit of being
found not guilty by reason of insanity."'25
Expert witnesses are often similarly

pretextual. In one case, a testifying doctor
conceded that the may have "hedged" in
earlier testimony (as to whether an insanity acquittee could be released) "because
he did not want to be criticized should
[the defendant] be released and then comMost importantly,
mit a criminal
all aspects of the judicial decisionmaking
process embody pretextuality. To a significant extent, this fear that defendants
will "fake" the insanity defense to escape
punishment continues to paralyze the legal system, despite an impressive array of
empirical evidence that reveals (1) the
minuscule number of such cases, (2) the
ease with which trained clinicians are
usually able to "catch" malingering in
such cases, (3) the inverse greater likelihood that defendants-even
at grave
peril to their life-will more likely try to
convince examiners that they are "not
crazy," (4) the high risk in pleading the
insanity defense (leading to statistically
significant greater prison terms meted out
to unsuccessful insanity pleaders), and ( 5 )
the far greater length in stay that most
successful insanity pleaders (a minute
universe to begin with) remain in maximum security facilities than they would
have served had they been convicted on
the underlying criminal indictment. In
short, pretextuality dominates insanity
defense decisionmaking. The inability of
judges to disregard public opinion and
inquire whether defendants have had fair
trials is both the root and the cause of
pretextuality in insanity defense jurisprudence.
Finally, little attention has been paid in
general to the role of social science data
in insanity defense decisionmaking. The
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law's suspicion of the psychological sciences is well documented. The issues before the courts in insanity defense cases
raise such troubling issues for decisionmakers that the courts' inherent suspicion
of the social sciences will be further
heightened. This, however, should not be
surprising. Traditionally, social science
has played a lesser role in the establishment of legal policy in areas "dominated
by clear ideological division" or "political
debate." The more social science contradicts "sentiments essential to other legal
institutions," the less likely that it will
'28
influence legal
I believe that much of the incoherence
of insanity defense jurisprudence can be
explained by these phenomena. Stereotyped thinking leads to sanist behavior.
Sanist decisions are rationalized by pretextuality on the part of judges, legislators, and lawyers and are buttressed by
the teleologic use of social science evidence and empirical data. This combination of sanism and pretextuality fits with
traditional ways of thinking about (and
acting toward) mentally disabled persons;
it reifies centuries of myths and superstitions and is consonant with both the way
we use heuristic cognitive devices and
our own faux, nonreflective "ordinary
common sense."
How, then can we (should we) try to
order a reconstruction of insanity defense
jurisprudence? There may be a certain
measure of hubris in attempting to articulate a new vision of insanity defense
jurisprudence, especially at this historical
moment. Nonetheless, I offer these suggestions. I must begin with the rueful
recognition that our societal track record
20

is not one to inspire much optimism.
Thus, while I am not entirely sanguine
about the future of this enterprise, I am
offering a series of what I will call behavioral suggestions for insanity defense
policymakers, scholars, and other citizens. I do this because I believe that, if
there is to be any meaningful insanity
defense reform, it is critical that each
of us begin the process of changing the
way we behave when confronted with the
insanity defense and insanity defense
pleaders.

A Reconstruction
Such behavioral changes are an absolutely essential precondition to certain
needed legal reforms. I believe, for instance, that the Insanity Defense Reform
Act of 1984 was nothing more than a
pandering charade, and that Congress
should abandon its return to this restrictive form of the M'Naghten test. The
combination of this cognitive-only test,
coupled with the Act's placement of the
burden of proof on defendants (by more
than the preponderance standard), leads
to an increase in the number of severely
mentally disabled criminal defendants
who will be inappropriately incarcerated
in penal facilities. I also believe that the
guilty but mentally ill verdict is notlung
more than a meretricious sham, which
should be abandoned.
However, even if all of these reforms
were to be judicially and/or legislatively
mandated, the incoherence of our insanity
defense jurisprudence would continue,
because none of these legal questions focuses on the single most important inquiry (which I identified earlier): why do
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we feel the way we do about "these
people"?
The answer to that question, as I have
tried to demonstrate, is to be found in the
way that centuries of myths have led to
sanist thoughts and practices on the part
of all insanity defense decisionmakers.
This sanism-abetted by heuristic reasoning and reliance on a false, alleged "ordinary common sense" and further contaminated by our authoritarian spirit-leads
to pretextual judicial decisions supported
by teleologic reasoning. I thus conclude
that it is only through behavioral change
that there can be any meaningful amelioration of this jurisprudential incoherence.

Behavioral Recommendations
First, we must discuss the underlying
issues openly. We must openly discuss
sanism, identify it, and explain its pernicious impact on all aspects of the legal
system. System decisionmakers must regularly engage in a series of "sanism
checks" to insure, to the greatest extent
possible, a continuing conscious and selfreflective evaluation of their decisions to
best avoid sanism's power. As part of this
strategy. we must educate judges and legislators and other policy-makers as to the
roots of sanism, the malignancy of stereotypes, and the need to empathically consider alternative perspectives.
Sanism infects all aspects of the insanity defense process: legislators, judges,
jurors, and counsel, as well as the media
that report on insanity defense cases.
Each and every one of these participants
bears some culpability in our current state
of affairs, and all must bear the burden of
eradicating sanist thought and behavior.

Second, it is essential that the issues
discussed here be added to the research
agendas of social scientists, behaviorists,
and legal scholars. Researchers must
carefully examine case law and statutes to
determine the extent to which social science is being teleologically used for
sanist ends in insanity defense decisionmaking. They must also study the empirical database that rebuts the empirical and
behavioral sanist myths and must confront this discontinuity in their writings.
In addition, researchers must enter the
public arena and share their research findings with legislators, the media, and the
public.
These inquiries will help illuminate the
ultimate impact of sanism on this area of
the law, aid lawmakers and other policymakers in understanding the ways that
social science data are manipulated to
serve sanist ends, and assist in the formulation of both normative and instrumental
strategies that can be used to rebut sanism
in insanity defense decisions.
Third, we must find ways to attitudinally educate counsel for mentally disabled criminal defendants so that representation becomes more than the hollow
shell it all too frequently is. We must
restructure the provision of counsel to
insure that mentally disabled individuals
are no longer represented by, in Judge
Bazelon's famous phrase, "walking violations of the Sixth ~ m e n d m e n t . " ' ~ ~
Fourth, we must create a new scholarship agenda that critically examines the
questions I have raised here.
Fifth, we need to consider carefully the
burden of heuristic thinking. Judges, like
the rest of us, use simplifying cognitive
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heuristic devices in their thinking. Recent
scholarly literature has begun to assess
carefully the impact of heuristics on Supreme Court decisionmaking; we need to
apply this same thinking more comprehensively so as to assess behavior of expert witnesses, counsel, mental health
professionals, and jurors.
Sixth. we must rigorously apply therapeutic jurisprudence principles to each
aspect of the insanity defense. 130-135 We
need to take what we learn from therapeutic jurisprudence to strip away sanist
behavior, pretextual reasoning, and teleologic decisionmaking from the insanity
defense process. This would enable us to
confront the pretextual use of social science data in an open and meaningful way.
Seventh, we need to integrate insanity
defense insights into all aspects of mental
disability law. Mental disability is no
longer-if it ever was-an obscure subspecialty of legal practice and study. Each
of its multiple strands forces us to make
hard social policy choices about troubling
social issues: psychiatry and social control, the use of institutions, informed consent, personal autonomy, the relationship
between public perception and social reality, the many levels of "competency,"
the role of free will in the criminal law
system, the limits of confidentiality, the
protection duty of mental health professionals, and the role of power in forensic
evaluations. These are all difficult and
complex questions that are not susceptible to easy, formulistic answers. When
sanist thinking distorts the judicial process, the resulting doctrinal incoherence
should not be a surprise.
22

Conclusion
The development of the insanity defense has tracked the tension between
psychodynamics and punishment and reflects our most profound ambivalence
about both. On one hand, we are especially punitive toward the mentally disabled, "the most despised and feared
group in society"136; on the other, we
recognize that in some narrow and carefully circumscribed circumstances, exculpation is-and
historically has beenproper and necessary. This ambivalence
infects a host of criminal justice policy
issues involving mentally disabled criminal defendants beyond insanity defense
decisionmaking: on issues of expert testimony, mental disability as a mitigating
(or aggravating) factor at sentencing and
in death penalty cases, and the creation of
a "compromise" GBMI verdict.
The post-Hinckley debate revealed the
fragility of our insanity defense policies
and demonstrated that there was simply
not enough "tensile strength" in the criminal justice system to withstand the public's dysfunctionally heightened arousal
that followed the jury verdict. Despite
doctrinal changes and judicial glosses, the
public remains wed to the "wild beast"
test of 1724, a reflection of how we truly
feel about "those people."137 It should
thus be no surprise that, when Congress
chose to replace the ALIIModel Penal
Code insanity test with a stricter version
of M'Naghten, that decision was seen as a
victory by insanity defense supporters.
These dissonances. tensions, and ambivalences-again,
rooted in medieval
thought-continue to control the public's
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psyche. They reflect the extent of the gap
between academic discourse and social
values and the "deeply rooted moral and
religious tension" that surrounds responsibility decisionmaking.'" They lead to
sanism, to pretextuality, and to teleologic
decisionmaking. They seek confirmation
in "ordinary common sense" and in the
use of heuristic cognitive devices. Ours is
a culture of punishment, growing out of
our authoritarian spirit. Only when we
acknowledge these psychic and physical
realities-and the anthropology of insanity defense attitudes-can we expect to
make sense of the underlying jurisprudence.
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